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UNITED STATES - STANDARDS FOR
REFORMULATED AND CONVENTIONAL
GASOLINE: THE EFFECT OF THE WORLD
TRADE ORGANIZATION DECISION ON THE U.S.
AND ITS ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES*
In March 1996, the World Trade Organization ("WTO") handed down its
first Dispute Settlement Panel decision since its inception in January 1995.'
The new procedure was one of many changes promulgated by the Uruguay
Round on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ("GATT"), but this
change created a new organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO),
which supplements GA'IT as a governing institution. Not only does the WTO
hear trade disputes brought by WTO member countries, but the WTO now has
an enforcement power which GATT never had. At issue in the WTO's first case
was a very sensitive, yet burgeoning, area of international trade law-the envi-
ronment.
In 1963 the Clean Air Act ("CAA") was passed by Congress in an effort
to put an end to the ever increasing air pollution caused by factories and auto-
mobiles. Congress amended the CAA in 1990 in order to introduce new regula-
tions to reduce vehicle emissions from gasoline and its constituents The Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency ("EPA") introduced the final rule in 1993 that set
forth the baseline constituent levels that gasoline could have based on 1990
figures.' The regulation designated nine highly-populated areas of the United
States as "non-attainment areas," where only reformulated gasoline is allowed in
order to reduce vehicle emissions.4 The rest of the United States was allowed
to use gasoline that was as clean as 1990 gasoline, called conventional gasoline.
This Note will discuss in detail how the Gasoline case developed. First,
this Note will examine the EPA's rule in controversy, which was issued as a
* The official title for this decision is United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WTO No. WY/DS2/R (Jan. 17, 1996) [hereinafter Gasoline case]. While the Panel issued its deci-
sion January 29, 1996 to all member countries of GATT, the decision was not released to the public until
March, 1996.
1. See Steve Chamovitz, The WTO Panel Decision on U.S. Clean Air Act Regulations, INT'L TRADE
REP., March 13, 1996, at 459.
2. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No.2. 101-549, § 219, 104 Stat. 2492-500
(1990)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §7545(k) (1994)).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(8)(A). The Environmental Protection Agency went through the notice, com-
ment, and publication process required under the Administrative Procedure Act § 553. Initial notice of the
proposed rule was given in 61 Fed. Reg. 33703.
4. See 42 U.S.C. §7545(k)(10)(D).
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result of the CAA amendments in 1990. Second, this Note will examine the
initial decision by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body and the appeal heard by
the WTO Standing Appellate Body (the "Appellate Panel"). Finally, this Note
will analyze the United States' reaction to the decision, including how the Ex-
ecutive Branch rulemaking process works in relation to such a decision and
how the process may change as a result.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE DISPUTE
A. The Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline Standards Defined
At issue in the dispute was how to reach the "baselines," which determine
what the 1990 constituent levels were.' There were two different programs that
had these developed "baselines"--the reformulated gasoline program and the
conventional gasoline program.' The two programs used were based on wheth-
er the gasoline use was in a non-attainment area. The reformulated gasoline
program was divided into a simple and complex model." The simple model is
effective for 1995-1998 and includes requirements for particular constituents in
the gasoline, such as benzene, oxygen, and Reid Vapor Pressure These con-
stituents are governed by the "non-degradation standard" and must meet at least
1990 levels.9 On the other hand, the complex model does not apply the "non-
degradation standard" to any of these gasoline constituents. Instead, all constitu-
ents will be regulated, including T-90, sulfur, and olefins."°
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(B) (1994). "The non-attainment areas represent approximately one-third
of the gasoline consumed in the United States." Cynthia Maas, Should The WTO Expand GATT Article XX, 5
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 415 (1996)(quoting from Oversight of the Reformulated Gasoline Rule: Hearing
Before the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, 103d Cong. 44 (1994)(statement of Mary
Nichols, Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, EPA)).
6. Se 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(D). Venezuela's dispute was brought in conjunction with the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, October 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187, art.
111:4 [hereinafter GAIT].
7. See Mass, supra note 6, at 417.
8. See id.
9. See id. The EPA did not include these three components in the statutory requirement due to a lack of
data regarding their effects on the environment. See id. at 418 (citing Summary of the Submission of the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Venezuela to the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel in United States-Measures on
Gasoline, at 2-3 (June 1995)). The EPA wanted to allow ref'meries to continue production and prepare for the
future. The simple model approach thus seemed to be the best solution.
10. The baseline gasoline fuel properties for the complex model are:
API Gravity 57.4
Sulfur, ppm 339.
Benzene, % 1.53
RVP, psi 8.7
Octane 87.3
IBP, F 91.
10%, F 128.
50%, F 218.
90%, F 330.
End Point, F 415.
Aromatics, % 32.0
Olefins, % 9.2
Suturates, % 58.8
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The conventional gasoline program does not contain a specific time period
for compliance but requires that the refiners must meet the same non-degrada-
tion requirements for all constituents. This type of gasoline, which accounts for
two-thirds of that consumed in the United States, must meet the 1990 quality
levels for all ingredients, not just those spelled out in the reformulated gasoline
program."
Venezuela and Brazil claimed that discrimination in favor of domestic
refiners was in the non-degradation program for both reformulated and conven-
tional gasoline. 2 Each domestic refiner has three methods to use to determine
its own individual baseline concerning the "ozone-forming constituents."'3 If
the refiner does not have the data or was only in production part of or after
1990, it must use the statutory baseline. 4
For domestic refiners, the three methods available to help determine what
their particular baseline would be are somewhat complex and require inspection
of the facilities in most instances to determine that the data was correctly gener-
ated. Method One requires that "the refiner must use the quality data and vol-
ume records of its 1990 gasoline."' 5 This particular method is difficult even
for the domestic refiners to meet because many do not have all the necessary
data in order to calculate this baseline. These types of records and data were not
required in 1990 for any refiner, therefore, only the most detailed refiner will
be able to use this method to set its individual baseline. If the domestic refiner
cannot meet the Method One requirements, it must use its "blendstock quality
data and 1990 blendstock production records" to determine its individual base-
line under Method Two. 6 As a last resort, the domestic refiner can use Meth-
42 U.S.C. § 7545(k)(10)(B)(i) (1994).
11. See Maas, supra note 6, at 418.
12. See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 459.
13. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(b)(1)(i) (1996). "Method 1-type data shall consist of quality (composition and
property data) and volume records of gasoline produced in or shipped from the refinery in 1990, excluding
exported gasoline" Id. § 80.91(c)(1)(i). "A refiner or importer must determine a baseline fuel parameter value
using only Method 1-type data if sufficient Method 1-type data is available per paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this
section." Id. § 80.91(c)(4)(i). "Method 1 sampling requirements. At least half of the batches, or shipments if
not batch blended, in a calendar month shall have been sampled over a minimum of six months in 1990." Id.
§ 80.91(d)(1)(ii).
14. See id. § 80.91(b)(4)(iii). The regulation provides: "An importer which cannot meet the criteria of
paragraphs (b)(4)(i) or (ii) of this section for baseline determination shall have the parameter values listed in
section (c)(5) of this section as its individual baseline parameter values." Id. "An importer of gasoline shall
determine an individual baseline value for each fuel parameter listed in paragraph listed in paragraph (a)(2) of
this section using Method 1-type data on every batch of gasoline imported by that importer into the United
States in 1990." Id. § 80.91(b)(4)(i). "An importer which is also a foreign refiner must determine its individu-
al baseline using Method 1, 2 and/or 3-type data (per paragraph (c) of this section) if it imported at least 75
percent, by volume, of the gasoline produced at its foreign refinery in 1990 into the United States in 1990."
Id. § 80.91(b)(4)(ii). See supra, note 12 for equivalent parameter value found in section (c)(5).
15. 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(b).
16. 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(c)(2):
Method 2-type data. Method 2-type data shall consist of 1990 gasoline blendstock quality data and
1990 blendstock production records, specifically the measured fuel parameter values and volumes of
blendstock used in the production of gasoline within the refinery. Blendstock data shall include vol-
umes purchased or otherwise received, including intracompany transfers, if the volumes were blended
as part of the refiner's or importer's 1990 gasoline. Henceforth in §§ 80.91 through 80.93,
"blendstock(s)" or "gasoline blendstock(s)" shall include those products or streams commercially
blended to form gasoline. Id.
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od Three, which allows the domestic refiner to use "its post-1990 gasoline
blendstock and/or gasoline quality data modeled in light of refinery changes to
show its 1990 gasoline composition."' 7 These domestic refiners do not have
the option of the statutory baseline.
For foreign refiners and importers, there was only one option if they did
not produce or import at least 75% of the gasoline produced by that particular
refinery in 1990. Their option was to comply with the statutory baseline.'8
That baseline is determined by the EPA based on the average gasoline quality
in 1990, not the individual refiner's average gasoline quality in 1990."9 Vene-
zuela and Brazil filed their complaint based on this very disadvantage. Foreign
refiners do not have the option of Method 1 unless the 75% rule is met. Fur-
thermore, they do not have the option to meet Methods 2 or 3 in any form.
They are required to stick to the statutory baseline which meant to Venezuela
and Brazil they did not enjoy the same individual baselines like domestic refin-
ers. These individual baselines allow the refiner to continue producing "dirtier"
gasoline than that produced by refiners using the statutory baseline in some
circumstances. This statutory baseline rule applies to the foreign refiners for
both reformulated and conventional gasoline with the exception being that a
domestic refiner producing in excess of the volume caps for conventional gaso-
line will also have to meet the statutory baseline for that excess.
17. 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(c)(3)-(7).
Method 3-type data shall consist of post-1990 gasoline blendstock and/or gasoline quality data and
1990 blendstock and gasoline production records, specifically the measured fuel parameter values and
volumes of blendstock used in the production of gasoline within the refinery. Blendstock data shall
include volumes purchased or otherwise received, including intracompany transfers, if the volumes
were blended as part of the refiner's or importer's 1990 gasoline. (ii)In order to use Method 3-type
data, the refiner or importer must do all of the following: (A) Include a detailed discussion comparing
its 1990 and post-1990 refinery operations and all other differences which would cause the 1990 and
post-1990 fuel parameters values to differ, and (B) Perform the appropriate calculations so as to
adjust for the differences determined in paragraph (c)(3)(ii)(A) of this section; and (C) Include a
narrative, discussing the methodology and reasoning for the adjustments made per paragraph
(c)(3)(ii)(B) of this section ... Tjhe post-1990 volumetric fraction of a blendstock is within (/-
)10.0 percent of the volumetric fraction of that blendstock in 1990 gasoline. For example, if a 1990
blendstock constituted 30 percent of 1990 gasoline, this criterion would be met if the post-1990 volu-
metric fraction of the blendstock in post-1990 gasoline was 27.0-33.0 volume percent. (B) The post-
1990 volumetric fraction of a blendstock is within (/-)2.0 volume percent of the absolute value of the
1990 volumetric fraction. For example, if a 1990 blendstock constituted 5 volume percent of 1990
gasoline, this criterion would be met if the post-1990 volumetric fraction of the blendstock in post-
1990 gasoline was 3-7 volume percent. If using post-1990 gasoline data, post-1990 gasoline
blendstock which left a facility and which could becomes gasoline solely upon the addition of oxy-
genate shall be included in the baseline determination, per the requirements specified in (c)(1)(ii) of
this section. Id. at (c)(3).
A refiner or importer must determine a baseline fuel parameter value using only Method 1-type data
is available, per paragraph (d)(1)(ii) of this section. If a refiner has insufficient Method 1-type data
for a baseline parameter value determination, it must supplement that data with all available Method
2-type data, until it has sufficient data, per paragraph (d)(1)(iii) of this section. If a refiner has insuffi-
cient Method 1- and Method 2 -type data for a baseline parameter value determination, it must supple-
ment that data with all available Method 3-data, until it has sufficient data, per paragraph (d)(1)(iii)
of this section. The protocol for the determination of baseline fuel parameter values in paragraphs
(c)(4)(i) through (ii) of this section shall be applied to each fuel parameter one at a time. Id. at
(c)(4).
18. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.91(c)(2).
19. See id.
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B. Interim Efforts to Avoid a Filed Complaint
The EPA gave certain justifications for using the two very different
schemes for domestic and foreign refiners.' First, the EPA claimed that they
could not use the same modeling techniques the domestic refiners could use be-
cause these techniques do not account for any changes in the production pro-
cess." Based on the EPA's claim that foreign processes have changed many
times since 1990, the establishment of the refinery of origin would be difficult
for setting individual baselinesm This fact is important because often importers
mix the gasoline from many foreign refiners to reach their end product. The
EPA also claimed that they could not monitor and inspect foreign refineries like
they could domestic ones. The EPA concluded that individual baselines for
foreign refiners were "technicalily] infeasibUe]."'  In an effort to avoid a
GATT complaint by Venezuela against the United States, the U.S. State Depart-
ment worked with the EPA to negotiate a new rule that would allow foreign
refiners to use individual baselines for reformulated gasoline.24 In the notice
and comment period of this proposed rule, environmental groups and large oil
companies lobbied Congress to place an appropriations rider on the EPA; in
essence forbidding any spending on this particular new rule once it became
effective and thereby forcing abandonment of the negotiationsOas
II. THE WTO's DECISION
A. The Complaint and the Ensuing Initial Panel Decision
Venezuela reinstated its GATr complaint after the Congressional "restrain-
ing action." Simultaneously, GATT transferred its adjudicative authority to the
WTO in compliance with the Uruguay Round. Venezuela decided it would be
best to refile its complaint with the WTO because of the "significant advantages
to complaining countries under the new [WTO] rules."26 The particular ad-
20. See Rules and Regulations, Environmental Protection Agency, 59 Fed. Reg. 7716, 7785-86 (1994)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80).
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. Id. at 7785.
24. See Gasoline case at 7. The panel briefly discussed the efforts made by the U.S. Department of State
and the Environmental Protection Agency to avoid a registered complaint by Venezuela. See also, Chamovitz,
supra note 2, at 459. "Mhe U.S. Department of State negotiated an agreement with Venezuela in early 1994
that [the] EPA would change the regulation if Venezuela withdrew its complaint." Id. After Venezuela did
withdraw its complaint, the EPA subsequently began to follow-through on these new rules. The EPA was
forced by court order to implement the initial rules found in 40 C.F.R. Part 80. In order to comply with the
negotiated deal, the EPA was forced to begin a new rule-making procedure. Once environmental and oil
groups were informed of the negotiated agreement with Venezuela, these groups began a strong lobby of
Congress in order to hopefully avoid such an agreement. The pressure exerted by these lobby groups con-
vinced Congress that they needed to adopt an appropriations rider, which had the effect of forcing the EPA to
abandon any further efforts in complying with the negotiated agreement. See id. The appropriations rider can
be found at 108 Stat. 2322. See id.
25. See id.
26. Id.
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vantages that Venezuela relied on were the "automatic adoption of panel reports
unless every country oppose[d] adoption"; whereas, prior to the WTO format,
these same panel reports required unanimous approval by all the countries sit-
ting on the council.27 After filing the complaint with the WTO, Venezuela re-
quested that a Dispute Resolution Panel be established to deal with this case.
Brazil joined the action as co-complainant once the Panel was established in
April 1995.
The Panel consisted of three highly qualified officials with long, outstand-
ing records in international trade. Joseph Wong from Hong Kong acted as the
Chairman. He had previously acted as the Hong Kong representative to GATT.
Crawford Falconer from New Zealand was the second panelist. He had previ-
ously acted as the director of his country's trade negotiation sector and is cur-
rently in charge of the Trade Directorate of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Kim Luotonen was the third panelist
from Finland. He had also previously served his country as representative to
GATT.2
Venezuela and Brazil argued to the Panel that the United States EPA rule
violated Article I and I of GAIT (1994), was not excepted under Article XX
of GAIT (1994), and violated Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers
to Trade ("TBT").29 Both countries asked that the Panel nullify the rule under
Article XXIII:1(b) and force the United States to bring the Gasoline Rule into
compliance with GAT and TBT provisions." The United States argued that
their policy fell into exceptions under Article XX(b), (d), and (g) of GAIT
(1994) even if the Panel found it to violate Articles I and/or Il.
i. Article 111:4
The Panel began its decision by addressing whether the Gasoline Rule
violated Article 111:4 of GAT (1994).32 There were two elements that Vene-
zuela and Brazil needed to prove in order to succeed with their claim. First,
they had to show a "law, regulation or requirement affecting the internal sale,
offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of an imported
product."'33 Second, they had to show "treatment accorded in respect of the
law, regulation or requirement that is less favourable to the imported product
than to the like product of national origin."'34
27. Id.
28. See id. at 11. See also, Gasoline case at 1. This information is significant because panel decisions are
binding against the member countries involved in the complaint.
29. See Gasoline case at 7.
30. See id. at 7-8.
31. See id. at 8.
32. GAIT Article 11:4 provides in relevant part:
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other con-
tracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of
national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offer-
ing for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.
33. Gasoline case, supra note 1, at 47.
34. Id.
[Vol. 33:421
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 33 [1997], Iss. 1, Art. 19
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss1/19
REFORMULATED GASOLINE CASE: EFFECT ON U.S.?
In order to decide this issue, the Panel had to decide if "like" products
were involved in the dispute. Unfortunately, there is no definitive answer as to
what aspects need to be present in order to decide whether the products are
"like." The Panel looked to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to
determine what rules should govern this type of interpretation.35 The Conven-
tion stated that "a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with
the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in the light of its object and purpose." (emphasis added.) Looking at the ordi-
nary meaning of the term "like," the Panel decided that because the products
were chemically identical, have the same end uses, and are substitutable, gaso-
line from domestic and foreign refiners satisfies the definition of "like" products
under Article m11:4.3' Furthermore, the Panel decided that future decisions on
whether products were "like" needed to be determined on an ad hoc basis. In
other words, the Panel refused to set a precedent for future proceedings by
definitively determining what would constitute "like" products.
Second, the Panel had to decide whether the EPA had been treating the
gasoline from foreign refiners less favorably than gasoline from domestic refin-
ers. In order to decide this issue, the Panel had to look at whether or not forc-
ing the foreign refiners to use the statutory baseline was to be considered "treat-
ment less favorable" than that given to the domestic refiners. The Panel deter-
mined that unless the foreign refiners were given the same opportunity to for-
mulate their own individual baseline, they were "prevented from benefiting
from as favourable sales conditions as were afforded domestic gasoline."'38 The
Panel believed this discriminatory practice attributed to the reality that domestic
refiners were able to produce "dirtier" gasoline than the foreign refiners since
the domestic refiners were able to set their individual baselines.
The Panel next went to dismiss the United States' argument that the for-
eign refiners were "similarly situated" to domestic producers who were not in
production all of 1990 or did not begin production until after 1990. The panel
dismissed this argument by stating that an Article mH:4 violation is determined
by looking at the products, not at the "characteristics of the producer and the
nature of the data held by it."39 The Panel cited to the Malt Beverages case in
support of its finding on this point.' °
The Panel also dismissed the United States' argument that on balance there
had been no more favorable treatment to domestic refiners. The U.S. formulated
this argument based on the precept that the Gasoline Rule did not discriminate
based on the nature of the statutory baseline calculation and because the aver-
35. See id. at 48. See also VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, January 27, 1980, art. 31,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter VIENNA CONVENnON].
36. VmNNA CONVENTION at art. 31(1).
37. See Gasoline case at 48-9.
38. Id. at 49-50.
39. Id. at 50.
40. See id. (citing GATr Dispute Resolution Panel on United States-Measures Affecting Alcoholic and
Malt Beverages, B.I.S.D. 39S!206, para. 5.19 (adopted on June 19, 1992)).
1997]
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age individual baselines were substantially the same. The Panel dismissed this
argument by stating that there can be no balancing act in determining whether
there has been more favorable treatment to domestic products. In essence, there
can be no "offset" if treatment is more favorable in one area and less favorable
in another.4 The Panel relied on the Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 case
in this respect because the Panel in that case had "rejected any notion of bal-
ancing more favourable treatment of some imported products against less
favourable treatment of other imported products."'42
Under Article 111:4, the Panel decided that the United States was in viola-
tion because "like" products were involved and that the individual baseline
methods granted more favorable treatment to the domestic refiners over foreign
refiners who did not have the option to choose their own individual
baselines.43 This finding was consistent with other GATT dispute panel deci-
sions. Furthermore, the Panel seemed to be correct in finding that Article ffI:4
is violated by the Gasoline Rule because it puts an "importer performance re-
quirement" on the foreign refiners while the same requirement(s) do not apply
to the domestic refiners.
ii. Article XX
The Panel proceeded to examine whether Article XX(b), (d), or (g) could
be used to justify the United States action in the Gasoline Rule. Under the
GATT rules and regulations, there are exempted actions that fall under Article
XX. Of these exceptions used by the United States, two of the three are consid-
ered envrionmental: sections (b) and (g).
a. Section (b)
Under Article XX(b), the exception allows measures to be adopted that are
discriminatory if they are "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health." The party trying to invoke the exception carries the burden of proof
and must prove three elements. First, the party must prove that the "policy in
respect of the measures for which the provision was invoked fell within the
range of policies designed to protect human, animal or plant life or health."'
The Panel agreed that the Clean Air Act and its amendments was such a policy
that concerned the "protection of human, animal or plant life or health" under
Article XX(b).45
Second, the United States needed to prove that "the inconsistent measures
for which the exception was being invoked were necessary to fulfill the policy
41. See id. at 51.
42. Id. (quoting from GATI Dispute Resolution Panel on United States-Section 337 of the Tariff Act of
1930, B.I.S.D. 36S/345, para. 5.14 (November 7, 1989)).
43. See id. at 52.
44. Id. at 54.
45. See id.
[Vol. 33:421
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objective."' The Panel had to examine and define what the term "necessary"
meant in regards to this particular element. The Panel used the Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 case to assert that what is necessary cannot be justified if
"an alternative measure which it could reasonably be expected to employ and
which is not inconsistent with other GATT provisions is available to [the op-
posing party]."' While this definition had been adopted while deciding an Ar-
ticle XX(d) case, the Panel used the Thai Cigarette decision to show that it ap-
plied to Article XX(b) as well.' Under this element, the Panel decided that the
United States did have an alternative measure. The Panel suggested the idea that
foreign refiners could be given individual baselines or that the United States
could assign the statutory baseline to all producers.49 This particular area of the
decision has come under sharp criticism because the Panel did not establish "an
experts advisory group," which is allowed under the new WTO rules. Rather,
the Panel relied on its own interpretation and "saw no need to understand the
pollution implications of its decision."'5 Lastly, the United States needed to
prove "that the measures were applied in conformity with the requirements of
the introductory clause of Article XX." The Panel did not decide this issue
because the United States had already failed to meet the second element under
Article XX(b)'
b. Section (d)
The United States also relied on Article XX(d) as an exception to compli-
ance with GATr rules. Article XX(d) allows an exception to GATT principles
if the rule "secure[s] compliance with laws or regulations themselves not incon-
sistent with the [GATT]." ' 2 The Panel dismissed this exception quickly by stat-
ing that the Gasoline Rule was already in violation of Article H:4 and could
not be considered a method of securing compliance to the baseline system. The
Gasoline Rule was simply a rule "for determining the individual baselines."' 3
The Panel dismissed this exception readily because the first element was lack-
ing in proof by the United States 4
46. Id.
47. Id. at 56 (quoting from GAIT Dispute Resolution Panel on United States-Section 337 of the Tariff
Act of 1930, B.I.S.D. 36S/345, para. 5.26 (November 7, 1989)).
48. See GATT Dispute Resolution Panel on Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes
on Cigarettes, B.I.S.D. 37S/200, para. 75 (November 7, 1990).
49. See Gasoline case at 57-59. Steve Chamovitz questioned the panel's decision on this issue because
the Panel did not assemble an experts' advisory panel in order to determine how feasible certain alternatives
measures would be. He notes that assigning the statutory baseline to all producers would require another
amendment to the Clean Air Act by Congress. Whether or not Congress is willing to go this far in complying
with its international obligations has yet to be determined. Currently, a powerful lobbying effort is in progress
in Washington to persuade Congress to only adopt the minimum measures required to bring the United States
into compliance with this decision. See Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 462.
50. Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 462.
51. See Gasoline case at 60.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. The Panel did not discuss the other two elements needed to be proven in order to use this exception.
If the first element had been met, the United States would have to prove that "the inconsistent measures for
1997]
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c. Section (g)
As a last resort, the United States attempted to rely on Article XX(g).
Article XX(g) states the exception applies if the measures are "relating to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures are made effec-
tive in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or consumption.""5
Once again, the United States had the burden of proof on four elements. First,
the United States had to prove "that the policy in respect of the measures for
which the provision was invoked fell within the range of policies related to the
conservation of exhaustible natural resources." ' The Panel held that clean air
fit the definition of an "exhaustible resource" because "it could be depleted." '
Second, the United States had to prove "that the measures for which the excep-
tion was being invoked -this is the particular trade measures inconsistent with
the [GATT]- were related to the conservation of exhaustible natural resourc-
es."' 8 In order to define "related to", the Panel looked to the Herring and
Salmon case. 9 That Panel decided that while "a trade measure did not have to
be necessary or essential to the conservation of an exhaustible natural resource,
it had to be primarily aimed at the conservation of an exhaustible natural re-
source to be considered as 'relating to' conservation with the meaning of Arti-
cle XX:(g). '"w ThPanel concluded that this particular element had not been met
because there was "no direct connection" between the discrimination against
foreign refiners and the United States "objective of improving air quality in the
United States."'" The Panel did not decide the third and fourth elements under
this exception because it believed that the United States had failed to prove the
second element.62 The Panel's decision on this issue seems confused because
they based their decision on "a factual determination that consistency with Arti-
cle Ill would not prevent [the] EPA from attaining 'the desired level of conser-
vation of natural resources under the [G]asoline [R]ule."' 63 This particular dis-
which the exception was being invoked were necessary to secure compliance with those laws or regulations;
and that the measures were applied in conformity with the requirements of the introductory clause of Article
XX." Id.
55. See id. at 62.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 62-3. Venezuela argued the United States' assertion that air was an exhaustible natural resource
in relation to Article XX(g) because the air's "condition changed depending on its cleanliness." Id. The Panel
dismissed this argument because it determined that "Itihe fact that the depleted resource was defined with re-
spect to its qualities was not.., decisive." Id. at 63.
58. Id. at 62.
59. See GAIT Dispute Resolution Panel on Canada-Measures Affecting Exports of Unprocessed Herring
and Salmon, B.I.S.D. 35S/98, para. 4.4 (March 22, 1988) [hereinafter Herring and Salmon case]. See also,
GATr Dispute Resolution Panel on United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, DS29/R, para. 5.13 (circu-
lated but not adopted on June 16, 1994).
60. Gasoline case, supra note 1, at 63-4 (citing from Herring and Salmon case).
61. Id. at 64.
62. The Panel did not address the third and fourth elements under the Article XX(g) exception, but if the
United States had succeeded in showing that its regulation was related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources, the Panel would have been required to answer the following two questions. First, whether
"the measures for which the exception was being invoked were made effective in conjunction with restrictions
on domestic production and consumption." Id. at 62. The second question was whether "the measures were
applied in conformity with the requirements of the introductory clause of Article XX." Id.
63. Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 462.
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cussion is confusing because Article XX(g) does not require that the non-com-
pliance with GATT be "necessary."
iii. Article XXIII: 1(b) and the Technical Barriers to Trade
The Panel concluded that it was unnecessary to examine Venezuela's argu-
ments under Article XXlII:l(b) because the Panel had already decided that the
EPA regulation had violated Article 1:4 and could not satisfy any of the ex-
ceptions under Article XX. Furthermore, the Panel decided not to address any
of the TBT arguments presented by Venezuela and Brazil. The Panel gave
no reasons for this non-decision other than that its decisions under the GATT
resolved the issue at hand.' When the Panel decided not to address the TBT
arguments, the member countries realized that their founded reliance on the
TBT in helping uphold environmental regulations was completely unfounded.
The Panel helped clarify "the relationship between the longtime GATT and the
new TBT rules." 5 The United States, even under an Article XX exception,
would still have had to meet the additional requirements under the TBT. The
TBT is viewed as additional member requirements under the GATT. Further-
more, the Panel made no mention of the preamble to the WTO which included
language regarding the environment. The United States partially relied upon this
language when joining the WTO because President Clinton believed that the
WTO would bring about the "greening" of world trade regulations.' Currently,
the member countries are unsure of how their environmental regulations will be
viewed under the WTO procedures since the TBT and the preamble were not
discussed in the Panel's decision in this case. The future decisions of the Panel
clearly need to clarify the role of these two important pieces of WTO/GATI
membership.
B. The Appeal
Following the Panel's decision, the United States appealed to the WTO's
Standing Appellate Body on February 22, 1996. In the Appellate Body's deci-
sion, the Panel noted that Venezuela and Brazil had every right to cross-appeal
the initial Panel's conclusions that air was an "exhaustible natural resource"
under the Article XX(g) analysis and the initial Panel's failure to answer and
resolve the TBT issues. Following this merely procedural finding, the Appellate
Panel agreed with the initial Panel's decision that the EPA regulation violated
Article m11:4 and that the United States would have to find an Article XX excep-
tion in order to avoid the violation. Where the Appellate Panel disagreed with
the initial Panel was under its Article XX(g) analysis. The Appellate Panel
determined that the overall Gasoline Rule was to be viewed in order to deter-
mine discrimination rather than differing baselines.67 The Appellate Panel de-
64. See Gasoline case at 65.
65. Charnovitz, supra note 2, at 463.
66. See id.
67. See Stephen L. Kass, Clean Air, Trade and WTO's New International Law, N.Y.U., June 3, 1996 at
11
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termined that the United States had met the Article XX(g) requirement that the
regulation "relate to" conservation. In the end, the Appellate Panel decided that
the United States was not in compliance with the Article XX preamble. The
United States was required to show that the different discriminatory rules were
"justifiable" and that no "reasonable alternative" existed." The Appellate Panel
was not satisfied that the United States had exhausted all other non-discrimina-
tory regulations before using the Gasoline Rule. In fact, the Appellate Panel
pointed out that the United States seemed sensitive to their own U.S. refiners
and their difficulties with compliance while at the same time ignoring the same
issues on a foreign level.69 The Appellate Panel went to great lengths to ex-
pand the initial Panel decision under Article XX(g) and recognized that legiti-
mate environmental regulations may satisfy this exception as long as it does not
violate the preamble to the Article.
The United States appeal was heard by three of the seven members of the
Dispute Standing Body (DSB). The appellate ruling was required to come down
within 60 to 90 days of the filing of the appeal." The appellate decision is
considered the final avenue of adjudication and the decision is considered bind-
ing and absolute once adopted by the GATT Council. 1
mH. UNITED STATES' REACrION AND CONSEQUENCES OF DECISION
A. Initial Reaction by Congress and the EPA
At the time of the initial Panel decision and the administration's decision
to appeal, Congress issued an order to the EPA stating that it should "stand
firm" because any compliance might open up issues with other U.S. environ-
mental laws. 2 One setback for the WTO settlement procedure is that violating
member countries do not have to implement changes to their WTO-invalidated
law. When the appeal was filed, Congress urged non-compliance with the initial
Panel decision. What Congress did not realize at the time was that non-compli-
ance could mean trade sanctions against the United States. Congress believed
that the United States had to decide at this point which was more impor-
tant-global trade efforts or the administration's environmental efforts. At this
stage of the dispute, the administration seemed to be leaning towards the envi-
-ronmental efforts and indicated an intended abandonment of its trade advance-
ments. 3 On the other hand, the administration did not have to appeal. It could
S3.
68. See id.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. Under the old dispute settlement system, a decision was only binding if all GATT council members
accepted the Panel decision. In other words, one council member could veto the decision and avoid any bind-
ing effect. The new dispute settlement system requires that all GATT council members vote against the Panel
decision in order to nullify the decision.
72. Gustavo Capedevila, Trade: Washington Lodges Appeals of WTO Ruling, Inter Press Serv., February
22, 1996, available in westlaw Interps database.
73. Mickey Kantor, then United States Trade Representative, said at the time of the appeal that the WTO
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have opted to comply with the decision and rid the regulation of the discrimina-
tion or it could have compensated Venezuela and Brazil by offsetting the dam-
ages with lower tariffs for that particular product.74
Why the administration acted in this manner is questioned by many. Mick-
ey Kantor at the time of the initial decision was quoted as saying that he was
"not surprised" by the Panel's decision' The appeal decision should not have
come as a surprise to Mr. Kantor either. The United States lost the appeal in
late April, after administration officials told the public that the appeals process
could take until the 1998 standards for reformulated gasoline went into effect,
thus negating any decision against the United States with regards to reformulat-
ed gasoline. 6 Even after the appeals decision came down, the EPA announced
its intentions to change nothing with regard to the reformulated Gasoline
Rule.' The United States was faced once again with three options: 1) to com-
ply with the WTO appeals decision and eliminate the discrimination in the EPA
regulation, 2) to offer Venezuela and Brazil lower tariffs and/or damages to
compensate for their trade losses, or 3) to subject the United States to WTO-
authorized trade sanctions and retaliation. The latter decision would not be wise
for the United States considering that the United States economically depends
on its exports: While there have been many negative soundbites by environ-
mental groups, by some liberals who say that the environmental goals of the
Clinton administration will be compromised, and by conservatives, like Pat
Buchanan, who see the WTO as a sovereignty-usurping organization, the United
decision had no force in the United States. He was quoted as saying "it is for the United States to determine
how to respond," but that the dispute would "not, and cannot, compromise the Clinton Administration's com-
mitment to our environmental laws." USTR Files Appeal of WTO RFG Ruling, Autoparts Rep., March 1,
1996, available in Westlaw Autoptr database.
74. See Judith Bello, Mr. Kantor Meet Mr. Buchanan, WASH. TIMES, March 22, 1996, at A21. Ms. Bello
supported the view that the United States should have simply complied with the decision because of the
administration's hard-fought passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and for Uru-
guay Round of GATT, which established the WTO. Ms. Bello believes that the administration by appealing
was only furthering Pat Buchanan's arguments that the WTO was an "unjust, anti-U.S. bureaucracy." Id.
75. See Chamovitz, supra note 2, at 463. Steve Charnovitz, who is the Director of the Global Environ-
ment and Trade Study at Yale, believed that the United States should have been prepared for this decision. Of
the eight decisions on environmental regulations that the United States Trade Representative's office has had
to defend, the office has won only three. Charnovitz also expressed the view that many of the editorials that
were published on the Panel's decision actually supported the decision because the United States' discrimina-
tion was obvious. Even though the likes of Pat Buchanan and environmental groups have expressed serious
concerns with Panel's decision, the author believes that the USTR should have been well-prepared for such an
initial decision. See id.
76. As noted before, the 1998 standards will apply to all refiners of reformulated gasoline; thus, discrim-
ination will not be an issue for reformulated gasoline because all refiners must act within the same parame-
ters. The discrimination with conventional gasoline will still stand until the U.S. revises its regulations,
though.
77. Carol Browner, an EPA administrator, stated that the EPA would not revise its rules even in light of
the WTO appeal. She stated that the United States' response should come from the United States Trade
Representative's Office, not the EPA. Despite WTO Decision, US to Stand By RFG Rules, Platt's Oilgram
News, Vol. 74, No. 93, May 13, 1996, available in Westlaw Platton database.
78. See Bello, supra note 74, at A21. The United States leads the world in exporting and to some degree
depends on the open markets of countries around the world who are members of GATT. If the United States
is allowed to discriminate on certain products, the WTO has the power to authorize discriminatory action in
member countries. The United States gets the full benefits of "nondiscrimination in other countries' markets,
in return for which [the United States is] obliged to reciprocate by not discriminating in our market" Id.
13
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States has emerged as the leading country in instituting WTO actions against
other member countries. 9
B. The Decision to Comply and the Parameters
Finally, on June 19, 1996, the United States decided to abide by the WTO
ruling. The United States had 60 days from the day of the Appellate Panel
decision to decide whether it would comply and revamp the regulation, whether
it would pay compensation to the two countries, or whether it would suffer the
trade sanctions."0 The United States Trade Representative Office ("USTR"),
under acting Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, warned Congress and
the administration against succumbing to retaliatory measures authorized by the
WTO because the United States would suffer not only in the Venezuelan and
Brazilian markets but also in markets around the world. The European Commu-
nity and Norway submitted briefs in support of the Venezuela and Brazil gov-
ernments during the initial action and purported to support retaliatory action
against the United States unless compliance with the decision or payment of
damages occurred.
While deciding to comply with the WTO decision, the United States must
do so within a reasonable time acceptable by Venezuela and Brazil or by a time
set by a WTO arbitration panel established upon request by Venezuela and
Brazil. The actions that the United States takes during this "reasonable" compli-
ance period will determine the impact of the decision on the United States and
its administrative agencies. The USTR required that the EPA begin "soliciting
comments on possible options" from industry components.8' Unfortunately, the
process of publishing the matter in the Federal Register and allowing time for
public comment is very time-consuming. Some administration officials have
insinuated that the matter could be stretched out until the 1998 uniform refor-
mulated gasoline regulations go into effect.' This potential fact worries Vene-
zuela and Brazil, who have spent countless hours and money trying to get the
interim rule changed. The two countries stand to lose $300 to $500 million per
year while this discriminatory standard remains in place. 3 At the same time,
Venezuela and Brazil may end up declaring a "moral victory" rather than a
monetary victory because they are already in the process of meeting the 1998
gasoline requirements and may very well be prepared to meet those standards
79. See Anne Swardson, Trial for the Trade Police; The WTO Has a Lot to Lose When It Hears a Com-
plaint, WASH. POST, October 16, 1996, at CI.
80. See Martin Crusinger, U.S. to Abide by WTO Ruling on Imported Gasoline, THE ASSOCIATED PRSS,
June 19, 1996, available in Westlaw Assocpr database.
81. WTO: U.S. Plans to Comply With Ruling in Gas Case, INT'L TRADE REP., June 26, 1996, at 1051.
The USTR pointed out in this article that compliance would include "protecting public health and the environ-
ment," while still eliminating the discriminatory measures of the regulation. Id.
82. See id. The WTO itself acknowledges that this territory has been uncharted because it has never had
to decide what a "reasonable" time for compliance is. As noted, this was the WTO's first case to decide under
the new Uruguay Round structure. WTO officials have been cited as saying that the process for compliance
could take one to two years. Id.
83. See In Brief, THE KNOXviLLE NEWS-SENTImEL, June 23, 1996, at D3.
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by the time an interim non-discriminatory reformulated Gasoline Rule is
made." While this anticipated final outcome to the issue may not prove to be
efficient, many countries are declaring the WTO procedural framework a suc-
cess.'5 Since the Gasoline case was decided, 38 complaints have been present-
ed to the WTO, but many of these have been resolved through out-of-court
settlements. Still, the WTO and the Dispute Settlement Body have become
active "arbiter[s] in international trade disputes."86
This fact may not settle well with the United States Congress, the Clinton
Administration, or the Environmental Protection Agency. Even though most
political groups supported the WTO during its initial formation, the United
States in general is not happy about the outcome in this case, but at the same
time the United States has used the same system more than any other coun-
try.' Unfortunately, that fact does not stop the U.S.-based oil companies and
their lobbyists. Congress still has the power to put the EPA funding in a bind if
it decides to follow through with the rulemaking functions to change the refor-
mulated Gasoline Rule. Congress while addressing this decision issued a 'sense
of the Senate' amendment" without any force of law that asked the EPA to
strongly consider health and environmental concerns while still meeting interna-
tional treaty obligations.88 While Congress did not reject any EPA action by
using an appropriations rider, like previously done while the EPA and the
84. Gerry Karey .... while RFG Rules Overhaul Gets Underway, PLATT'S INT'L PETROCHEMICAL REP.,
June 27, 1996, available in Westlaw Plattipr database. See also, Gerald Karey, Venezuela Asks EPA To Shift
RFG Rule, Cites WTO Stance on Discrimination, PLATr's OILGRAM NEWS, Monday, October 7, 1996, avail-
able in Westlaw Platton database. The national oil company of Venezuela filed its comments with the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency during the comment period, asking that the EPA "proceed... with all deliber-
ate speed to amend the rule to comply with the ... WTO." Id. PDVSA (the national oil company of Vene-
zuela) noted that the EPA could have proceeded to initiate a new rule immediately without following the
notice and comment procedure. PDVSA claims that the EPA merely asked for comments regarding "the gen-
eral issue of imported gasoline, and not on specific proposed regulatory language." PDVSA focused on the
discriminatory effect of conventional gasoline in its comments because it realized that by using the notice and
comment procedure the EPA is unlikely to fashion a new rule for reformulated gasoline before the 1998 stan-
dards become effective. Id.
85. Sir Leon Brittan, the European Commissioner for Trade, stated that the WTO dispute settlement
procedures were successful on five counts: 1) "[The action] was brought to a conclusion fast, just 16 months
from the date consultations were requested, including the appeal," 2) "[t]he process was entirely automatic,
with no possibility for the US to block the establishment of the panel or the adoption by the DSB of the re-
port of the Appellate Body," 3) "[tlhe quality of the legal reasoning of the Appellate Body was very good,
and firmly based on a general interpretation of rules of public international law," 4) "[the Appellate Body
showed a lot of common sense in interpreting GATT provisions according to their normal and reasonable
meaning," and 5) "[it was also quite astute politically in accepting, but for good legal reasons, part of the US
Administration's arguments in its appeal. This softened the blow to the US Administration, and made accep-
tance of the report on the US home front easier." EUIWTO: Dispute Settlement Procedure Approved By Com-
mission, EUROPEAN REP., July 6, 1996, available in Westlaw Eurorep database.
86. Irene Ngoo, New Dispute Mechanism Puts WTO on Right Track, SINGAPORE STRAITS TIMES, Sep-
tember 10, 1996, available in Westaw Strtstm database. Ms. Ngoo points out-that the DSB has become "the
most active WTO body with meetings held almost twice a month" At the time of her piece, there were six
active panels, one requested panel, and 25 trade disputes being decided by the WTO. Id.
87. See supra, note 81.
88. Gerald Karey, EPA Funding Is Caught In Senate Snag, But Resolution On Gasoline Imports Is
Passed, PLATr's OiLGRAM NEWS, September 6, 1996, available in Westlaw Platton database. This type of
Congressional amendment does not have any force of law, but the amendment seeks to influence the EPA
"not to accept any individual refiner baselines unless it determines that issues of auditing and inspection of
foreign facilities, as well as enforcement, have been addressed." Id.
15
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USTR were trying to negotiate a compromise with Venezuela before this initial
action, similar amendments are expected. Senator Conrad Bums tried to intro-
duce an amendment that would "ban use of EPA funds to implement the for-
eign refimer baseline rule for reformulated gasoline" during a subcommittee
markup of EPA funding legislation.89 The Bums amendment was not intro-
duced during the floor debate, and Congress seems to be allowing the EPA and
USTR to bring the United States into compliance.
C. Consequences to Administrative Agency Normal Procedure
Normally, the United States could have implemented changes more quickly
through different administrative actions. Instead of following the traditional
informal rulemaking procedures contained in the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"), the EPA could have normally used a number of exceptions to issue a
more immediate, amended regulation. Under the APA, public property and
foreign or military affairs are exempted from informal rulemaking procedure.
The various agencies can also exempt actions from the informal rulemaking
procedures if the action involves agency management and personnel, rules of
procedure for the agency, statements of policy, interpretive rules, or good
cause."° But, these type of exceptions are not available when modifying a rule
because of a WTO adjudication decision.9' The EPA could have issued a state-
ment of policy or claimed good cause and implemented a non-discriminatory
rule immediately, though, while still complying with the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act ("URAA"). Venezuela and Brazil have yet to take issue with
the informal rulemaking procedure being used, but both countries still have the
right to institute a complaint with the WTO claiming that the United States is
not acting within a reasonable time considering that the 1998 reformulated
gasoline regulations are fast approaching.' If an arbitration panel is set up by
the WTO to hear a complaint on the expediency of the United States' action,
89. Senator Bums (R-Mont.) was requested to withdraw his amendment and introduce it on the floor of
the Senate after Chairman Bond (R-Mo.) requested that "controversial amendments be offered on the Senate
floor, not in markup." Kimberley Music, Burns Pledges to Offer Amendment on Foreign Refining on Senate
Floor, THE OIL DAILY, July 11, 1996, available in Westlaw Oildaily database. Senator Mikulski (D-Md.)
warned Bums of the "retaliatory trade actions" that could be taken if his proposed amendment passed. She
agreed with his idea because she had contemplated offering an amendment to favor the U.S. refiners earlier
during the issue, but she remained skeptical because of the retaliatory measures that are authorized under the
WTO. Id.
90. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) & (2). "Rule making: (a) This section ap-
plies, according to the provisions thereof, except to the extent that there is involved--) a military or foreign
affairs function of the United States; or (2) a matter relating to agency management or personnel or to public
property, loans, grants, benefits, or contracts." Id. Also, see the exceptions under § 553(b)(A) & (B) for inter-
pretive rules, general statements of policy, etc.
91. See infra, note 94.
92. See Gerald Karey, Venezuela Asks EPA to Shift RFG Rule, Cites WTO Stance on Discrimination,
PLATr'S OLRAM NEwS, October 7, 1996, available in Westlaw Platton database. PDVSA stated that "in
light of [the] EPA's extensive consideration of the treatment of imported gasoline in previous rulemakings and
its intimate involvement in the WTO case, it could have 'proceeded directly to a proposed regulation to elimi-
nate the discrimination.' Instead, PDVSA said, EPA has initiated a rule making by requesting public com-
ment .... Id. Venezuela obviously is well aware of how long informal notice and comment rulemaking can
take, but they have yet to take any action with the WTO to establish an arbitration panel.
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the possibility still exists that a decision will not be made until late 1997.' 3
Venezuela and Brazil might still benefit from the ability to import reformulated
gasoline free of the discriminatory rule even if only for a few months. Both
countries' inaction may rest in the fact that both have already begun the compli-
ance process for the 1998 regulations. If both meet the 1998 regulations before
the arbitration panel could decide the untimely action issue against the United
States, any decision by the WTO would be moot on the reformulated Gasoline
Rule because both countries could import their gasoline automatically into the
United States using the 1998 regulations. BuT, both Venezuela and Brazil
would benefit from a non-discriminatory conventional gasoline rule, which
applies to non-attainment areas, constituting about 2/3 of the United States.
The "moral victory" that both Venezuela and Brazil can claim will not
only be for the oil industry but also for any other industry that the United
States has discriminatory regulations in place. However, the United States will
still have the delaying tactic in its favor. If the United States wants to remain
one of the international powerhouses in the global trading game, administrative
agencies will need to address these discriminatory practices in a timely fashion.
Currently, adminstrative agencies use the time-consuming informal rulemaking
procedure which involves notice, comment, and publication of final rule. This
procedure is dictated by Section 553 of the APA and takes an average of a year
before the new rule or regulation takes effect.94 In the future, the United States
could be faced with a problem if countries like Venezuela and Brazil win a
WTO proceeding. While Venezuela and Brazil have not instituted a complaint
because of untimeliness in compliance, other countries who obtain a decision in
93. At the time of publication, no arbitration panel was requested by Venezuela or Brazil regarding the
issue of timely compliance.
94. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(d)(1994).
(b) General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons
subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in
accordance with law. The notice shall include-
(1) a statement of the time, place, and nature of public rule making proceedings;
(2) reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed; and
(3) either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and
issues involved.
Except when notice or hearing is required by statute, this subsection does not apply-
(A) to interpretative rules, general statements of policy, or rules of agency organiza-
tion, procedure, or practice; or
(B) when the agency for good cause finds (and incorporates the finding and a brief
statement of reasons therefor in the rules issued) that notice and public procedure
thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public interest.
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to
participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or with-
out opportunity for oral presentation. After consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency
shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose. When
rules are required by statute to be made on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing sec-
tions 556 and 557 of this title apply instead of this subsection.
(d) The required publication or service of a substantive rule shall be made not less than 30 days
before its effective date, except-
(1) a substantive rule which grants or recognizes an exemption or relieves a restriction;
(2) interpretive rules and statements of policy; or
(3) as otherwise provided by the agency for good cause found and published with the rule.
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their favor from the WTO against the United States in the future could institute
such an action for timely compliance. Any such action of this nature could
bring the traditional yet time-consuming rulemaking procedures of agencies to
issue. Before such a situation could develop, the United States would have to
decide to comply with a WTO ruling. Once again, if the United States does not
decide to comply, other countries can take WTO-approved retaliatory trade
actions which can consist of sanctions, tariff increases and any number of other
trade-inhibiting actions. Without saying, such retaliatory actions are not in the
United States' best interests as the world's largest exporter. Conversely, if the
United States decides to comply with a WTO decision and does not do so in a
timely manner, a WTO arbitration panel can take actions to bring the United
States into compliance. To this date, no arbitration panel has been called on to
determine if a country's compliance has been carried out in a timely manner.95
IV. CONCLUSION
In the meantime, many debates rage on about how the WTO dispute settle-
ment system could undermine the executive branch rulemaking when the matter
is settled in the early stages or even before the dispute ever reaches the adjudi-
cation setting in the WTO. Currently, however, when the WTO issues results in
an adjudicative action, the simple "foreign affairs" exception of the APA cannot
stand on its own when the agency issues a rule to comply with a WTO ruling.
Rather, certain types of political controls exist so the exception is not conve-
nient. Under the URAA, an agency must take multiple steps to include Con-
gress and the public." Agencies are bound to a set of rules beyond the scope
95. See Bhushan Bahree, Rules of the Game, WALL ST. J. EUR., July 23, 1996, at 4. Mr. Bahree discuss-
es the problems with the WTO while praising the efficiency of the organization at the same time. One "wor-
ry" that the author points out is that there are "concerns" over the:
implementation of WTO's finding. While specific about many other matters, the dispute-settlement
agreement is vague about the implementation time frame. For example, the agreement says that after
an appellate report, which is a final ruling, the "reasonable period of time to implement should not
exceed fifteen months from the date of adoption (of the finding)." The agreement then adds: "howev-
er, that time may be shorter or longer, depending on the particular circumstances." Id.
This vagueness in defining what time frame may be used could result in a stalling tactic used by countries
who receive a decision against them. The United States is able to use this vague rule to take fifteen months or
longer, if proven necessary, to comply with the decision against them. In the meantime, the United States
government could be dragging its feet, wasting taxpayers' money, and avoiding compliance altogether.
96. See Aubry D. Smith, Note, Executive-Branch Rulemaking and Dispute Settlement in the World Trade
Organization: A Proposal to Increase Public Participation, 94 MIcH. L. REV. 1267, 1284-5 (1996).
Before modifying any regulation or practice, the relevant agency or department must seek advice
from the advisory committees, consult the appropriate congressional committees, submit to the con-
gressional committees a report explaining and justifying the proposed rule or practice modifications,
accompanied by a summary of the advice obtained from the advisory committees, and engage the
public by providing notice and opportunity for public comment. The USTR and the head of the rele-
vant department or agency must have consulted the appropriate congressional committees on the
proposed final rule or other modification sixty days before the change goes into effect. The Senate
Finance Committee or the House Ways and Means Committee may cast a nonbinding "vote to indi-
cate the agreement or disagreement of the committee with the proposed contents of the final rule or
other modification."
Id. at 1286 (citing the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, § 123(g)(l)-(3), 108 Stat. 4809,
4831-2 (1994)).
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of the APA when dealing with an adjudicative decision by the WTO.' But,
these types of actions are only required when the agency is acting on an adjudi-
cative decision, not on a negotiated agreement, similar to the one attempted by
Venezuela, the State Department, and the EPA before this action was filed with
the WTO. This issue has yet to be addressed, but there have been suggestions
for changes to the URAA as applied to the current WTO negotiation procedure
in order to increase public participation to the level required in adjudicative
actions.98
Some industries have welcomed the decision in the Gasoline case and the
international powerplay by the WTO. For example, the chemical industry recog-
nizes that the WTO/GATT means "truly free commerce."' At the other end of
the spectrum, certain industries fear that the WTO decision will infringe on
their abilities to successfully lobby Congress. Not only has the oil industry been
highly vocal, but certain farm groups, like American Corn Growers, have bitter-
ly opposed any change in U.S. sovereignty over its own industries."°  What
these embittered industries do not realize is that global trade is here to stay. As
the world moves closer and closer every day to becoming its own free trade
area, the more open-minded the economic powerhouse countries need to be
when formulating their national policies. The Gasoline case shows that no lon-
ger will these powerhouse countries be able to bully the smaller member coun-
tries.
At the other end of the spectrum, though, the United States' sovereignty is
brought under scrutiny by deciding to comply with the decision.'0 ' As one ar-
97. See id. at 1286.
98. See id. at 1287. The author suggests amending the Trade Act of 1974 and amending the URAA it-
self. The suggested amendments to the Trade Act include requiring the USTR to consult advisory committees,
allow public participation in the areas that would not violate the secrecy required by the WTO, and involving
Congress during the advisory committee stage. All of these amendments would affect section 135 of the
Trade Act. The author also suggests amending the URAA to the effect that the same rule-making provisions
that the URAA provides for adjudicatory actions will also apply to negotiations in the WTO. See id. at 1290.
The issue that these amendments affect is secrecy. How can governments effectively negotiate a dispute while
most, if not all, of the information is made public. The tendency under these amendments would be for more
countries to forego the negotiations step in the WTO Dispute Settlement System and proceed directly to the
adjudicative action; thus, the efficiency that the WTO prides itself on currently could vanish and disputes
could drag on indefinitely without such negotiation steps.
99. David Wakeford, The Hidden Strength Behind International Trade, CHEMISTRY AND INDUSTRY,
October 7, 1996, at 729. The author points out that the global chemical industry relies on "international trans-
actions being predictable, fair and non-discriminatory" because their annual global trade averaged around
$400 billion in 1994 alone with growth occurring since then. Id. The author also points out that the formation
of the WTO gives GATT the teeth it needed for a long time by forcing member countries to accept all provi-
sions of the agreement and not allowing them to "'cherry pick.' the provisions that they don't like. Id.
100. ACGA Responds to WTO Importing Decision, Clean Air Network Online Today, Sept. 26, 1996,
available in Westlaw Canot database. ACGA was among the first groups to submit comments to the EPA
when the United States decided to comply with the WTO decision. ACGA suggested in its comments that if
foreign baselines were to be permitted that they be based on the "actual volume of imported RFG and con-
ventional gasoline equal to the refiner's import volume in 1990." Id. This type of requirement would mean
that foreign refiners would not be able to account for their increase in imports from 1990 to present.
101. See Charley Reese, America Loses If Independence Is Sacrificed For World Government, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, July 21, 1996, at G2. Mr. Reese argues that the United States is losing its independence as envi-
sioned by the founders by being members of WTO/GATI and the United Nations. See id. What he falls to
realize is that being a member of WTO/GATT does nothing but ensure that the United States remains a key
global trading partner. The United States depends on its ability to export its products. Beyond the economics,
19
Schelin: United States--Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoli
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1997
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
ticle put it, "[a]n international body caused the United States to reconsider its
[own] laws. ''""a Furthermore, critics of the decision say that not only is U.S.
sovereignty in jeopardy but the environment is also threatened by the decision.
But, the decision does neither. While the WTO decision did nullify an EPA
rule, the dispute panel did not say that the United States had to allow dirtier
gasoline into the United States. The WTO said that the United States must try
harder to make the rules non-discriminatory. 3
The WTO decision in the Gasoline case was a good one for almost every-
one. While the oil refining industry claims that allowing foreign refiners to set
their own baselines will allow dirtier gasoline into the United States, the envi-
ronmental groups that would listen should realize that the oil industries' allega-
tions are self-motivated. At the same time, the environmental groups should be
cautious when reviewing the decision because the WTO Dispute Settlement
Panel and Appellate Panel did little to clarify the degree of justification that a
country must give in order to satisfy foreign discrimination when promulgating
a rule to preserve an exhaustible resource. The WTO is at a crucial turning
point in proving its efficacy. Recently, the European Union instituted a com-
plaint against the United States citing that the Helms-Burton Act, which penal-
izes other countries and their companies who continue to do business with
Cuba, is in violation of WTO/GATT rules and regulations. 4 How the United
States would decide to act if a decision comes down against it in this complaint
is yet to be announced, but there is a strong feeling that the United States
would again try to find an exception to the rule. 5 Fortunately, this expected
case may resolve the sovereignty issue in the near future, but no case is set at
the WTO to develop the environmental issues from the Gasoline case more ful-
ly- 6 The bitter war between free traders and environmentalists will continue
the United States actually gains by complying with the decision because currently the United States has
brought more complaints than any other WTO member and has more complaints pending.
102. WTO and U.S. Trade, BANGOR DALY NEWS, July 2, 1996. The author of the article points out that
while the United States must reconsider its law, the decision by the WTO was appropriate and compliance is
in the United States' best interest because of the United States' extended use of the WTO's adjudication sys-
tem. See id.
103. See Fair Trade and Clean Air, WASH. PosT, July 4, 1996, at A28. What is curious about the entire
EPA process is that originally the gasoline rule was formulated to allow the foreign refiners to set their own
baselines based on their data. Now, the EPA starts where it left off. While the WTO will allow a rule that
protects an "exhaustible resource," the country instituting the rule must show that its has considered all other
possibilities yet the discriminatory effect cannot be avoided. See id.
104. See INT'L TRADE REP., supra, note 81. The general consensus is that a decision by the United States
not to- comply with a WTO decision would place the entire new system in jeopardy. In fact, one former U.S.
trade deputy, Rufus Yerxa, has said that "[tihe stakes are definitely getting higher for the WTO to show the
decision-making process is credible and fair." Id. The WTO Director-General Renato Ruggiero points out that
"[t]his is the only rules-based system with enforcement capacity[trade retaliation, such as higher tar-
iffs] .... These are the rules that governments have agreed on. The U.S. Congress has ratified these rules." Id.
105. See Averting Trade Wars, WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1996, at A18. The author of this editorial speculates
that the United States "might use a 'national security' defense-absurd in real terms but a likely winner in
court" if the EU forces the U.S. into a WTO case. Id. The case acts like a two-edged sword to some degree.
"If [the United States] succeeded, other countries would be tempted similarly to invoke national security to
defend domestic sacred cows. If the United States lost, there could be a backlash in Congress." Id.
106. The European Union and the United States entered negotiations last spring in order to avoid a WTO
action. The complaint was "deferred" until October 15 while the two countries try to broker a deal. Roger
Cohen, French Scoff at U.S. Protest Over Gas Deal With Iran, N.Y. TIMEs, September 30, 1997, at Al, A9.
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until the issue is more clearly developed and resolved."°
Telisa Webb Schelin
107. See WTO: Trade and Environment Committee Adopts Text For Singapore Meeting, INT'L. TRADE
REP., Nov. 13, 1996 at 1730. The WTO Trade and Environment Committee took an excessive amount of time
in negotiating its report for the WTO Singapore meeting set for December 1996. Committee delegates raised
a number of concerns with regard to how the WTO would act and react to other environmental agreements,
whether member countries would have to commit to "not introducing measures inconsistent with the WTO,"
and whether eco-labeling should be addressed in December. Id. The final committee report consisted of many
compromises which left some of these vital issues on the drawing board. Future committee reports will have
to address these same issues if the WTO expects to maintain its prestige amongst the environmental groups of
the world.
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